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Abstract 
 
The financial crisis and the sovereign debt crisis have been attributed to a number of causes. 
Whether these are economic, social, cultural, or legal, they are all by and large also political. 
The aim of this article is not to delve into the myriad of heated political arguments that 
continue to dominate the scene, but to assess the impact of the financial crisis on the 
employment protection rights and the corporate rescue regimes in Greece, Portugal, France, 
and the United Kingdom. In light of the crisis, the rights of the workforce have been severely 
compromised to afford financially troubled companies a greater opportunity to recover. In 
order to minimise the catastrophic impact of financial turmoil on their economy and society, 
all four jurisdictions introduced reforms to their labour codes and corporate rescue 
mechanisms, often in the name of austerity.  
 
This article will offer a snap shot of the changes, their effects, and an assessment whether or 
not the reforms of pre-insolvency regimes have operated as an effective embankment for the 
protection of social and economic welfare. The purpose of this piece is to shed a light on the 
changes that have occurred that have affected employment rights in the domestic legal 
systems of individual member states, as influenced to some extent by the EU in its 
expectations of improvements to increase labour market flexibility, and whether corporate 
rescue mechanisms in individual member states are able to provide some counter balance to 
the erosion of employment rights generally. 
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Introduction 
 
The financial crisis and the sovereign debt crisis that followed it have been attributed to a 
number of causes. Whether these are economic, social, cultural, or legal, they are all by and 
large also political. The aim of this article is not to delve into the myriad of heated political 
arguments that continue to dominate the scene, but to assess the impact of the financial crisis 
on the employment protection rights in Greece, Portugal, France, and the United Kingdom 
and to examine its impact on their corporate rescue regimes with a view to understanding 
what the legislative and social changes may mean for the future of these individual nations, 
their people and businesses, and perhaps for the EU and Eurozone as a whole. In light of the 
crisis, the rights of the workforce have been severely compromised to afford financially 
troubled companies a greater opportunity to recover. In order to minimise the catastrophic 
impact of financial turmoil on their economy and society, all four jurisdictions introduced 
reforms to their labour codes and corporate rescue mechanisms, often in the name of 
austerity.  
 
This article will only offer a snap shot of the important changes that have occurred, the 
effects as understood at the current level of research, and an assessment whether or not the 
reforms of pre-insolvency regimes in particular have operated as an effective embankment for 
the protection of social and economic welfare, the former of these having already been 
significantly reduced throughout the EU. It is not intended that this piece be viewed as an 
indictment on the EU approach to matters of sovereign debt, which member states then had to 
manage from their own legal and economic perspectives. Rather, it is intended to shed a light 
on the changes that have occurred that have affected employment rights in the domestic legal 
systems of individual member states, as influenced to some extent by the EU in its 
expectations of improvements to increase labour market flexibility, and whether corporate 
rescue mechanisms in individual member states are able to provide some counter balance to 
the erosion of employment rights generally. 
 
 The Financial Crisis, Sovereign Debt, and the Euro Plight 
 
The EU has changed significantly since the beginning of the financial crisis of 2007. Where 
there was once an unbridled emphasis on the protection and creation of workers’ rights in 
many nations, these were tempered by pressing financial issues of rampant sovereign debt. 
Not every European country experienced the financial crisis or suffered from it in the same 
way. This is due in part to the position in their economic cycles, the effects of membership of 
the Eurozone, and the spending habits of their governments and consumers.  
 
The issues separating the southern and northern European countries in the effects of the 
financial crisis can be traced in part back to the creation of the European Monetary Union. 
The decision to enter into a common currency, while in principle strictly financial, had huge 
political and social implications as it provided an unprecedented connection between the 
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destinies of European nations who had relinquished one of the most fundamental functions of 
sovereignty: the control of their own currency and monetary policy.4 While the launching of 
the Euro was met with hope that it would create a wave of competitive, reforms across 
Europe, not every country succeeded in implementing long-lasting reforms that would help 
them to cope better with the discipline of living within a single currency.5 Peripheral 
countries, of which Greece and Portugal are two, made strenuous efforts to qualify for the 
Euro by reducing public spending and holding down wages and other costs, but in some 
countries these provisions were relaxed once they were admitted to the monetary union.6 In 
addition, the single currency also equalised the competition between exporting countries as 
depreciation could no longer be used as a means to lower costs. As such, those countries who 
had to raise their costs to meet a standard rate of currency effectively lost a portion of their 
market share within the EU, leading to trade deficits and contributing in part to the sovereign 
debt crisis.7 The single monetary policy therefore created tensions between countries 
positioned along different phases of their economic cycles, which in times of crisis, led to an 
asymmetric effect as countries could no longer undertake the devaluation of their currency in 
order to bolster their economies.8 
 
Due to being a part of the Euro, Greece and Portugal could not address their mounting 
problems by devaluing their currency. They were also unable to address their fiscal problems 
through inflation given the European Central Bank’s aversion to it.9 With no recourse to 
devaluation or inflation, the Euro became a straightjacket for those member states struggling 
with sovereign debt. To avoid sovereign default and financial collapse, Greece and later 
Portugal needed financial assistance.10 Greece and Portugal agreed to a Memoranda of 
Understanding11 in exchange for bail out money conditional upon certain changes to 
economic policy based on expected targets that would be periodically reviewed. The targets 
listed included fiscal policy objectives of reducing the government deficit accompanied by a 
number of recommendations on how to do so; financial sector regulation and supervision; 
fiscal-structure measures; labour market and education; housing market; and other framework 
conditions including improving the functioning of the judicial system.12  In order to meet the 
targets set out in the MoU, Greece and Portugal adopted austerity measures to decrease the 
costs within their economies by cutting employment and wages and by introducing structural 
policies aimed to increase wage and price flexibility. These measures aimed to deregulate the 
labour market to increase competition, embarking on an internal devaluation to meet the 
objectives in the MoU as construed by the “troika” of the International Monetary Fund, the 
EU and the European Central Bank. The domestic policy approaches adopted in response to 
the MoU worsened liquidity problems, causing markets to further doubt the potential for the 
countries to repay their loans, thus asking for higher interest rates to mitigate investment risk, 
which in turn worsened their fiscal position.13 The bailout itself was not only an attempt to 
help the ailing Southern European countries, although its effects on the people of Greece and 
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Portugal serve to contradict this proposition, but also to keep them from defaulting on their 
sovereign debt obligations, which would cause severe damage to the European banks. Thus 
the bail-outs were also in the self-interest of the rescuers and the EU economy overall.14  
 
The EU entered into a number of new pacts and treaties, both within the Eurozone and 
internationally, to combat and prevent further economic destabilisation. Among its policies 
for dealing with the crisis was the flexibilisation of the labour market by encouraging 
member states to adjust labour market rigidities and contain pension expenditure. These 
policies have generally affected only the Eurozone countries; thus the UK has largely been 
left to manage its labour system as it sees fit. This did not stop the UK from taking up the de-
regulation baton, however, as a number of changes have been made that undermine 
employment protection. The implementation of the Euro Plus Pact, which was thrust in an 
“indelicate manner” on the other heads of government in the European Council by France and 
Germany, aimed to foster competitiveness and employment, contribute to the sustainability of 
public finances, and reinforce financial stability. While these non-binding instruments lack 
legal force, the response of the EU to the crisis presented a pernicious threat to workers due 
to deregulation of employment rights at national levels, prompting the risk of an EU driven 
“race-to-the-bottom”, an element that has previously been the focus of prevention in EU 
social policy.15 Thus instead of the EU as an instrument of protection for vulnerable 
employees, it has since 2007 consistently undermined the level of protections it once 
supported. In order to meet the targets of the MoU and repay the bail out money, both Greece 
and Portugal significantly cut pay and jobs in the public sector, curtailed pensions, and 
restricted pension rights. Retirement age was increased, a threshold for pensions was 
introduced, and pensioners lost a considerable part of their pensions due to the abolition of 
the Christmas, Easter, and summer bonuses. Portugal went a step further and applied a 
special levy on self-employed people, having the same effect to those changes made for 
employees. Welfare benefits became less generous and more conditional with less protection 
for the unemployed along with cuts in social and public works budgets.16 Changes to 
Portuguese law came to resemble the lower level of protection and workers’ rights that exists 
in the UK.17 
 
The Impact of the Financial Crisis on Workers’ Rights 
 
Not every jurisdiction has reduced workers’ rights to the same degree; however, every 
country has taken some steps within their labour and employment law systems with a view to 
improving their economic position. Fundamental changes to working time and atypical 
employment (albeit often temporary) were made throughout the EU as a response to the 
economic crisis. Changes to redundancy rules, industrial relations structures and processes 
also occurred, affecting the social dialogue, often by engaging in measures to decentralise 
collective bargaining, which have tended toward permanence. Regardless of whether such 
changes were permanent, they had the effect of undermining the protective role of labour and 
employment law, placing workers in a more precarious position than they would have 
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enjoyed prior to the financial and sovereign debt crisis.18 In addition, pensions were 
significantly affected by the crisis throughout the EU member states. Each jurisdiction under 
examination amended its labour code in order to simplify hiring and dismissal rules.19   
Greece 
 
Greece took steps in line with the protective function of labour law during the initial stages of 
the crisis; however, its perspective changed completely in response to the need to meet the 
targets set by the MoU.20 The financial crisis revealed endemic weaknesses in the Greek 
welfare system and employment regime, in part due to the dualist labour market comprised of 
an official public pool that makes its contributions and is protected by the employment laws 
in place, and a shadow labour market that is subject to the precariousness of the poor 
economic climate and is not generally entitled to the same level of social protection. Much of 
Greek public infrastructure has been developed through the use of structural loans, which 
increased sovereign debt while encouraging household consumption. Thus when Greece had 
to resort to the troika for rescue, the austerity measures imposed as a result of the MoU 
targets had a severe impact on its welfare system.21 The overall goals of the MoU were to 
eliminate fiscal imbalances by achieving fiscal surpluses; to improve competitiveness; and to 
improve liquidity for Greece until its return to the financial markets.22 In order to do this, 
among other changes, wages would need to be lowered.23 
 
When the austerity measures were implemented by the Greek government, there was a rapid 
reduction of salaries in the public sector, which were transmitted quickly to the private sector, 
reducing the purchasing power of the Greek people. This in turn created a deep and persistent 
recession, leading to a steep rise in unemployment. Greece also had to focus on reducing its 
debt burden, which diverted public expenditure from social benefits, health, education, and 
welfare provisions. Unemployment continued to rise, and peaked at 27.9% in July 2013, but 
remains the highest in the EU at 23% as of February 2017.24 The level and depth of poverty 
and personal despair intensified, not the least due to the fact that the unemployment fund is 
based exclusively on contributions, which those who had previously worked in the shadow 
economy or as undeclared workers will have not contributed to. Thus the social protection 
available is wholly inadequate to the nature of the Greek labour market.25 
 
The structural reforms to labour law were undertaken based on the premise that labour market 
regulation constituted a significant barrier to growth. Prior to the crisis, there had been 
significant resistance to any flexibilisation of the labour market through the implementation 
of laissez faire policies on collective bargaining. By the time of the crisis, Greece had some 
of the strictest employment protection legislation in the EU.26  In counterpoint to Greece’s 
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previously extremely employee friendly policies, the austerity policies applied in response to  
MoU targets were among the most severe fiscal austerity packages in Europe since the end of 
the Second World War.27 Employment remains highly fragile in those economies such as 
Greece that have been subject to austerity measures and where business restructuring and its 
effect on job security is an ongoing reality.28 
 
i. Wages 
 
In Greece, the minimum wage decreased by approximately 22% for adults and 32% for 
youths under 25.29 Public sector employees suffered a flat reduction in monthly salary as well 
as in holiday and annual leave premiums. Pay was also frozen and incapable of being affected 
by collective bargaining. Pay overall decreased by an average of 50% since the beginning of 
the sovereign debt crisis. This is due in part to the decrease in overtime pay, rendering the 
labour force less expensive and more flexible.30 
 
Wages were also affected by the introduction of partial unemployment as a measure that 
permits a company to alternatively employ employees for a number of days less than 
originally planned in their employment contract, along with the commensurate reduction in 
pay.31 
 
ii. Atypical Contracts 
 
Greece changed its rules on fixed term contracts, increasing the maximum term from two to 
three years.32 There was also an increased utilisation of rotational work and fixed term 
contracts in order to increase flexibility. 33 That said, Greece also introduced a new scheme 
for the protection of employees on reduced working hours in medium sized companies.34 
 
Greece also introduced new types of employment contracts that effectively reduced the 
protection that normal employment would provide. For example, a “youth contract” has been 
introduced through which young workers are hired on wages 20% less than the previous rate 
for first job, with a two-year trial period, no social contributions from employers, and no 
entitlement to unemployment benefits at the end of the contract.35 
 
iii. Hiring and firing 
 
One of its most serious austerity measures related to the reduction of the costs of hiring and 
firing employees.36 Greek law did not require the employer to justify the dismissal of an 
employee as a potentially fair reason, an aspect of its labour code that was in place prior to 
the crisis. Despite this fact, Greek severance packages were so generous that its labour system 
was still considered highly inflexible due to the costs of dismissal. Following the crisis, 
notification periods were significantly reduced, thereby reducing the potential for severance 
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compensation, with a concomitant reduction in the cost of dismissal.37 While justified in the 
name of competitiveness, these changes promoted the adoption of a short term solution for 
reducing costs via dismissals, rather than pursuing longer term strategies, further 
undermining employment security.38  
 
iv. Redundancy  
 
The law of 2010 raised the collective dismissals from four to six employees dismissed in 
enterprises with more than 20 employees and from two to five percent of employees in 
enterprises employing more than 150 people.39 It should be noted that this was still far more 
protective than the Collective Redundancies Directive,40 which stipulates 10 as the minimum 
employees in a company of more than 20 workers and ten percent in establishments 
employing at least 100 employees. Thus despite the changes applied to its collective 
redundancy regime, Greece remains highly protective in those circumstances relative to other 
EU member states. Redundancy compensation has also been reduced by 50%.41 
 
v. Collective Bargaining 
 
The fundamental nature of Greek collective bargaining changed in the wake of the crisis as 
aspects that had formed part of the fundamental industrial character have been wholly 
displaced, specifically in terms of the hierarchy of collective agreements, the reduction in 
potency of branch level collective agreements, the reduction in the extension period of 
agreements following their expiry, and the abandonment of mandatory arbitration in the 
settlement of disputes.42 Representation criteria of social partners was reviewed and trade 
union prerogatives were extended to other bodies of worker representation. 43 Greece also 
placed legal restrictions on the role of collective bargaining through the prohibition of wage 
increases until the unemployment rate reduced below 10%, a target that seems out of reach 
given the current unemployment rate noted above.44 In light of the troika review of the 
progress of implementing reforms in the labour laws of Greece, collective bargaining became 
the topic of ongoing discussions on the possibility of  unilaterally limiting the employee right 
to strike.  
 
vi. Access to Social Welfare 
 
Greece tightened restrictions on the access to social benefits as well as reducing the duration 
and level of payments as a part of their austerity measures.45 Further, the “workfare” 
employment measure expanded the use of fixed-term, quasi-employment in the community 
and public services, providing a minimum fixed income but few employment rights. Under 
the workfare rules, unemployed youth, long term unemployed, and the working poor with 
low annual incomes are granted five months of employment benefit in exchange for working 
six hours per day in community services. These workers replaced the need to hire within the 
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public service, which had been frozen in response to the MoU.46 However, Greece introduced 
subsidies for employers who recruit an unemployed worker.47 
 
Portugal 
 
Upon joining the European Union, Portugal was entitled to a large amount of structural funds 
with the aim of building up its infrastructure. Since 1986, the Portuguese economy has been 
dependent on funds coming from the EU as a strategic means to invest and as a way of 
attracting more foreign direct investment. The economy was thereby quite vulnerable to the 
withdrawal of such investment.48  A commonly held view was that Portugal’s sovereign debt 
crisis was directly related to its entering the framework of the Euro without having the 
economic fundamentals in place to survive the rigours of a single currency. Even before 
joining the Euro, while making efforts to qualify for membership by running a tight monetary 
policy to contain inflation and interest rates, there was a noticeable slowing of economic 
growth, particularly at the turn of the millennium.49 As early as 2005, austerity measures had 
already been enacted to combat an impending financial crisis that had been brewing since 
joining the Euro in 2001.50   
 
What is particular to the Portuguese economy that is not common among its other peripheral 
colleagues is that its constitutional and legal order significantly empowers the more organised 
segments of the workforce. Prior to its bail-out, Portugal had the most rigid employment 
protection laws in the Eurozone.51 Among developed nations it ranked last in terms of labour 
freedom52 and it has been asserted that such rigidity has impaired firm performance.53 While 
joining the Euro did have the effect of impairing Portugal’s ability to provide cheap products 
to the European market due to the levelling effect of the common currency, its highly rigid 
and protective labour system was also at the root of Portugal’s competitiveness problem, but 
this was also an inherently political issue.54 The Portuguese government negotiated with its 
social partners a new labour code that aimed to make the labour market more flexible. 
Despite the rigidity and superior power of Portugal’s social partners, these far reaching 
changes were supported by the main employers’ organisations, the second largest trade union 
confederation, and the socialist-social democratic General Union of Workers. Though 
vehemently opposed by the largest union, the Communist General Confederation of 
Portuguese Workers, the reforms were passed in November 2008.55 
 
In 2010, additional emergency austerity measures were introduced as a result of continued 
market pressure and successive downgrading by major credit rating agencies. In March 2011, 
in order to avoid a failure requiring the resort to external rescuers, further additional measures 
were introduced that would have made cuts to welfare and health, as well as freezing 
pensions, but this was not approved by parliament. Thus Portugal also resorted to the troika 
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for assistance and agreed to its own MoU, implementing cuts in response to the targets set 
that went well beyond those suggested in the MoU itself.56 
 
The labour market in Portugal shares some similarities to the Greek as it is also of a dual 
character. A large proportion of workers in large enterprises and the public sector enjoyed a 
high level of employment protection, while those in micro, small, and medium sized 
enterprises are less privileged as these companies often do not respect employment protection 
legislation and therefore demonstrate a high level of flexibility in hiring and firing. It is this 
latter labour sector that tends to be the hardest hit in times of crisis and explains the rapid rise 
in unemployment that occurred in similar fashion to Greece, despite the differences in the 
systems.57 The MoU suggested several areas in need of labour reform: reduction of long term 
unemployment and strengthening social protections; reform of the employment protection 
legislation in order to combat the segmentation of the labour market and to facilitate the 
movement of workers between professions, markets and sectors (flexibilisation of the labour 
market); improve flexibility of working time rules in order to fit the needs of peak business 
times and thus augment the competitiveness of Portuguese businesses; to connect the costs of 
labour with effective job creation; and   to approve legislation that serves to improve the 
employability of youth and of other traditionally disadvantaged categories of workers.58 A 
new labour code entered into force on 1 August 2012 which attempted to integrate the 
changes required in the MoU, under a flurry of cries against the constitutionality of the 
reforms, which were summarily ignored by the government in power at the time.59 
 
i. Wages  
 
Pay freezes were introduced for public sector workers as were freezes on promotions. 
Salaries were cut by between 3.5 and 10% in 2010. Salary and holiday bonuses were also 
abolished.60 In addition and as a subset of a reduction in wages, the Portuguese MoU had a 
considerable influence on the reform of working time rules, widening overtime options 
significantly. Previously, employees were paid 50% of their hourly wage for the first hour of 
overtime, 75% for additional hours and 100% for work on holidays and Sundays. These 
rewards were reduced by half.61 In addition, the working week was increased from 35 to 40 
hours for public sector workers and extended normal working hours for all employees by two 
hours per day in order to cut overtime costs. Four public holidays were also abolished.62 
 
ii. Atypical Contracts 
 
Portugal also rendered the rules on fixed term contracts more flexible by increasing the 
maximum length of a fixed term contract from 6 months to 3 years63 with the potential to 
renew twice not exceeding eighteen months in total before an indeterminate contractual term 
is applied.64 These changes in addition to the changes to dismissal rules generally saw a shift 
away from indeterminate contracts toward fixed term contracts due to the constitutionally 
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imposed difficulties of ending indeterminate term contracts,65 rendering job security far more 
precarious for many workers. 
 
iii. Hiring and Firing 
 
Prior to the reforms to the Portuguese labour code, the Portuguese constitution prohibited 
dismissals without a just cause or for political or ideological reasons. Essentially, it was 
impossible to dismiss an employee who had not behaved in an illicit or deviant manner 
having such gravity that it effectively destroyed the employment relationship.66 Following the 
introduction of the new labour code, there was an extension in the concepts of unsuitability 
and the extinction of worker positions in order to make individual dismissals easier. An 
employer can now establish non-discriminatory criteria for dismissals, drawing Portugal’s 
redundancy rules in line with what currently exists in the UK. Employers are also no longer 
obliged to offer a transfer to another suitable position when dismissing an employee for either 
unsuitability or the extinction of his job.67 
 
Portugal also reduced severance pay for workers from 30 days for every year of service with 
no maximum limit with a three-month minimum to 20 days per year of service with no 
minimum severance pay with a cap at 12 months’ wages or 240 times the minimum wage.68 
Further reforms were announced that brought the Portuguese severance packages into line 
with EU averages. Probationary periods for new employees were also raised from 3 to 6 
months. 
 
iv. Redundancies 
 
Prior to reforms, the system governing collective redundancies in Portugal was rigid, 
requiring verification of the reasons for the dismissals, and strict formal procedures.69 More 
flexible redundancy legislation was introduced, affecting the costs of lay-offs and other 
measures to reduce the financial burden on undertakings themselves. Eligibility and 
qualification periods were amended, providing more scope for worker dismissal, and 
redundancy benefits were reduced. In addition, Portugal introduced an “employers’ 
compensation fund” to finance redundancy benefits.70 
 
v. Collective Bargaining 
 
Portugal also underwent amendments to the procedures governing collective redundancies 
aimed at flexibilising existing legislation.71  It pushed for more firm level collective 
agreements and even individual agreements between employers and employees.72 There was 
a move toward making it possible for lower level bargaining to deviate unfavourably from 
higher level collective agreements or even statutory legislation. The representation criteria of 
social partners was reviewed and trade union prerogatives were extended to other bodies of 
worker representation.73 Portugal also made it impossible to bargain for conditions better than 
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the new labour code put into place.74 The overall effect of these changes represents a move 
toward decentralisation of trade union operation and served to weaken trade union action and 
representation at all levels of bargaining. It also weakened the acquired social rights achieved 
by trade unions at national and local levels, lowered the standard of recognised rights, and 
affected fundamental employment conditions and social protections.75 
 
vi. Access to Social Welfare 
 
In Portugal, the maximum amount of unemployment insurance was reduced by a third (from 
three times to only twice the social support index), and the maximum length of time the 
benefit could be paid was reduced from 900 to 540 days.76 However, there was also an 
increase in the maximum duration of entitlement to non-contributory social benefit for 
unemployment scheme.77 
 
France 
 
The plight of Greece and Portugal are only slightly reflected in the effects that have been felt 
on the welfare states of the central European countries, such as France and Germany. Many 
states reformed in ways that reduce entitlements, protection, and the welfare of precarious or 
unemployed workers. Temporary working also became more common, which had wide 
ranging implications for worker equality due to lower employment security and earning 
power. However, while these issues became common throughout the Eurozone and the UK, 
France’s protection for temporary workers remained the highest in Europe, despite an 
apparent need to deregulate temporary work in order to inject flexibility in the labour market 
and deal with high unemployment rates like the rest of the EU.78 Further, France introduced 
additional protections and assistance for their unemployed, including subsidised employment 
contracts and the extension to new groups of workers a Professional Transition Contract that 
provided intensive help with a job search over a twelve month period, during which a 
beneficiary was also entitled to higher benefit payments.79 
 
While France did not sink to the same depths of financial despair as Greece and Portugal, it 
has nonetheless sunk into a case of collective pessimism since the economic crisis in 2008. 
The economic crisis caused a fundamental disillusionment with the neo-liberal economic 
model and in the benefits of globalisation for France, though this scepticism has been 
prevalent for decades in the French psyche. By many, the welfare state was no longer 
perceived as sufficiently protective and the EU has often been viewed as less than a force for 
positive change than a source of economic difficulties. Thus nationalism also rose along with 
unemployment rates, faltering economic growth, and rising popular discontent. 80 While the 
highly regulated French economic model appeared to have been weathering the crisis better 
than the liberal English model, it was still nonetheless severely impacted by it.81  
 
The French banking sector was also not as severely compromised by the financial crisis as 
were the systems of the UK and Germany. This has been in part attributed to the way in 
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which France internationalised its banking sector with what has been viewed as a more 
diverse approach, with a combination of retail investment as well as corporate lending and 
investment banking, the latter two of course being the cause of much of the banking turmoil 
that caused the crisis. Although French banks were still heavily engaged in market-based 
banking, they were far smaller investors in toxic assets and other high risk activities.82 While 
the financial crisis did not bring substantial changes to the French banking system, the 
Banking Relief Act was adopted in October 2008 with the purpose of creating two special 
purpose vehicles (a Refinancing Company and a Recapitalization Company) with the aim of 
establishing a State guarantee for any debt securities issued by these two companies. This 
was the French method of supplying state aid to banks by means of a guarantee rather than 
directly. Through this Act, the French state essentially became a lender of last resort.83 
Throughout the crisis, soft forms of protectionism and limited foreign penetration remained 
features of the French banking system, while there was only an initial and temporary upswing 
of intervention as a result of the crisis.84 
 
In addition, more recent policy shifts presented in the Loi Macron,85 passed in late 2015, has 
had a number of interesting effects on French employment and labour as it aims generally to 
create more business friendly policies in line with the post-financial crisis need to liberalise 
the French economy.86 
 
 
i. Wages 
 
Short time working regimes were introduced in France as a result of the financial crises.87 
Short time working refers to the option of an employer to essentially “lay off” employees for 
a period of time each week or to reduce working hours on a daily basis in order to save 
money for the company. 
 
ii. Hiring and Firing 
 
The statute of limitations for claims relating to the performance or termination of the 
employment contract was reduced from five to two years and to three years for salary related 
claims (in stark contrast to the 3 months’ limitation period in the UK for employment tribunal 
claims!) France has also introduced an enticement to engage in alternative dispute resolution 
by introducing minimal lump sum compensation for employees willing to settle at a 
conciliation hearing before the labour court in dismissal cases.88  
 
iii. Redundancies  
 
In May 2013, France passed a Job Security Bill that introduced a number of reforms to the 
labour code relating to the rules governing collective redundancies. The new legislation 
affords employers a greater choice as to the procedure they follow when considering 
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collective redundancies in a company of more than 50 employees considering the dismissal 
of more than 10 within 30 days, triggering a job protection plan. This process was previously 
quite strict and required time-consuming and complicated information and consultation 
exercises with Works Councils. Employers were able to negotiate an agreement with a 
relevant trade union or to unilaterally implement a “social plan”, which allows employers to 
depart significantly from standard requirements governing the number of meetings with 
employee representatives, timetables for dismissals, and selection criteria with the aim of 
speeding up the collective consultation process. Works Councils were also deemed to have 
been consulted even if they failed to respond within a now closed timeline. Employers were 
also permitted to enter into agreements with trade unions under which employees agreed to 
detrimental changes to their terms and conditions in return for a commitment by the employer 
not to implement any redundancies during the term of the agreement, not exceeding two 
years.89 
 
France also added additional protections following the financial crisis. It adopted a law 
specifying that in the event that collective redundancies result in the offer of a new post 
abroad, remuneration must be equivalent to that paid in France. Further, the Court of 
Cassation ruled that contracts terminated by mutual consent for economic reasons in the 
context of a workforce reduction should also be counted within the number of intended 
redundancies, thus counting toward the thresholds of collective redundancies, which may 
then indicate the requirement for an employment safeguard plan to be put in place. 
Termination by mutual agreement can therefore not be used to circumvent the protections in 
place for employees subject to redundancy.90  
 
iv. Access to Social Welfare 
 
France has extended the maximum duration of compensated partial or technical 
unemployment and increased its compensation rates for the same. In addition, it made it 
easier to access the benefit system for those with short working records.91 France also 
extended its unemployment insurance agreements to better benefit the most precarious 
workers by reducing the minimum contribution period for unemployment insurance 
entitlement from six to four months. In addition, France offered a one off 500 Euro payment 
for young people lacking a substantial work history. Finally, the Professional Transition 
Contract has now been extended to workers in companies of all sizes and offered 80% 
replacement of previous gross salary and intensive job-seeking assistance for a year to those 
workers who have been made redundant for economic reasons.92 
 
v. Collective Bargaining 
 
Since the financial crisis of 2007, there was a further move toward making it possible for 
lower level bargaining to deviate unfavourably from higher level collective agreements or 
even statutory legislation. 93 Legislation in 2004 first made it easier for company agreements 
to diverge from industry level agreements, which was extended to working time by 
legislation in 2008. More recent legislation passed in June 2013 has implemented an 
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agreement on job security, though it also provisions for the possibility of companies in 
financial distress to reduce some pay rates and to make changes to working time in exchange 
for employment guarantees. However, use of these agreements have been limited to date.94 
The introduction of such provisions do indicate the recognition of the need to make 
allowances to diverge from protective norms in the event that an employing company is in 
financial difficulties.  
 
The United Kingdom 
 
While the UK experienced a sudden economic shock in terms of bankruptcies, decrease in 
consumer demand, drops in gross domestic product growth, and an increase in 
unemployment, it differs from France, Greece and Portugal in several significant ways. It is 
not part of the Single Monetary Union; it follows a liberal approach to the economy, and 
adopts a light touch to any kind of interventionist regulation,95 which was only enhanced 
through deregulation as a result of the economic crisis; and its financial structure was highly 
internationalised. As a result of this latter characteristic, it was one of the first European 
countries to be heavily hit by the global crisis due to its strong ties with the financial sector of 
the United States. The UK government injected billions of pounds into the failing banking 
sector through direct financial input, government guarantees of bank issuances, and the 
purchase of toxic bank equities.96 
 
In terms of social and unemployment problems precipitated by the financial crisis, Britain 
took a distinctly laissez faire approach, unwilling to improve, even temporarily, the already 
comparatively low support provided in unemployment. The UK’s approach to tackling the 
crisis was characterised mostly by tax cuts in an attempt to boost economic activity, while 
little was done to address those becoming unemployed, differing significantly in approach of 
the rest of Western Europe.97 It did initiate demand led measures in reaction to the rising 
unemployment, which amounted to incentives for employers to hire long term unemployed 
and funding programmes aimed at getting the unemployed back to work.98 
 
In addition, the UK proceeded to deregulate the labour market in a number of areas, including 
discrimination and equality. It has repealed provisions in the Equality Act 2010 relating to 
combined protective characteristics and third party harassment on the grounds that they are 
perceived as burdens on business. The duty on public authorities to have regard to the need to 
reduce socio-economic inequalities was repealed (though it never entered into force) and the 
duty on large employers to publish details of the gender pay gap was not implemented.99   
 
The UK also implemented a new employee shareholder status, in which employees can agree 
in exchange for shares with a minimum value of £2000 in the employer company to waive 
certain employment rights such as the right not to be unfairly dismissed, the right to statutory 
redundancy pay, entitlement to request flexible working except in limited circumstances, and 
the entitlement to request training or study. Employee shareholders are also subject to longer 
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notice periods before returning from maternity or paternity leave. While the waiver of 
employment rights does not preclude claims relating to discrimination and employees are 
required to take independent legal advice, entitled to a detailed statement of terms; and 
subject to a seven day cooling off period, the implications of this new form of contract 
essentially undermines the cornerstone of UK employment law: the employment contract.100 
It is yet to be seen what effect this new status may have on the equality in the employment 
relationship, bargaining power, and the relative security of employment.  
 
While most countries took action in relation to benefits for the unemployed affected by the 
financial crisis, Britain took a decidedly apathetic approach. It had the least supportive 
system for the unemployed prior to the crisis and proved to be the most reluctant government 
to improve its policies in the light of the critical economic conditions. Instead, Britain 
introduced employment subsidy schemes to benefit employers hiring the long term 
unemployed and focussed on other means of activating the unemployed in the country.101 
 
i. Wages 
 
The lack of intervention by the UK government led to the involvement in social partners in 
agreeing to collective agreements that reduced working hours and wages in order to save 
jobs, though in many cases massive redundancies were still unavoidable. The median pay 
settlement dropped and occupational pensions have been cut.102 
 
ii. Atypical Contracts 
 
Zero-hours contracts became common usage in the UK. These contracts mean that there is no 
obligation on the employer to provide work or for workers to accept it, but it also often means 
that employees are not permitted to work for another employer at the same time,103 leaving 
them in a precarious financial position. While a flexible workforce is one of the reasons cited 
for the UK pulling away from France and the rest of the Eurozone in terms of GDP growth, 
but the zero hours’ contract may also be creating a low-wage underclass to be summoned 
peremptorily by employers on a whim in a repeat in what might be recognised as a Victorian 
style industrial relationship. 
 
iii. Hiring and Firing 
 
Unfair dismissal rules have been substantially changed. Employees must now work for a 
minimum of two years’ continuous service rather than one year to qualify to claim unfair 
dismissal at an Employment Tribunal. Compensation has also been restricted to the lower of 
a specified amount not exceeding three times the median annual earnings of an employee or a 
specified number of not less than 52 weeks multiplied by a weeks’ pay of the employee.104 
 
iv. Redundancy and Acquired Rights 
 
The global economic crisis inevitably led to redundancies in the workplace, particularly 
relevant in those jurisdictions such as the United Kingdom that has relatively weak 
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protections in place against collective dismissals.105  The UK has undertaken to comply only 
minimally with EU obligations for worker protective obligations going forward, and the 
spectre of Brexit may only see these protections further eroded. Conditions governing 
economic dismissals were softened and thresholds loosened in order to increase labour 
market flexibility, making it easier for businesses to lay off workers in the UK.106 In 
particular, the consultation period for collective dismissals was shortened from 90 to 45 days 
for redundancies of more than 100 employees (the EU minimum is 30 days) and now 
excludes fixed term contracts that have reached their agreed termination date from collective 
redundancy obligations.107 There have also been reduced protections under the TUPE 
regulations: contractual conditions can now be more easily altered if the changes are 
connected with the transfer but are for an economic, technical or organisational reason 
entailing changes in the workforce; dismissals are no longer automatically unfair for changes 
in workplace; collective agreements can be renegotiated a year after the transfer; and it is 
now more difficult to satisfy the criteria of a service provision change (the work must be 
fundamentally the same).108  
 
v. Access to Social Welfare 
 
In Britain, there was a nearly complete absence of any improvement in income support 
measures.109 In fact, it has become increasingly difficult for the most vulnerable in society to 
access social benefits associated with loss of employment. 
 
vi. Access to Justice 
 
The UK has had a highly flexible labour market in comparison with other EU member states. 
However, it could be said that the financial crisis and its effects on labour markets throughout 
the EU provided an opportunity to further reduce employment rights through deregulation. 
Most significant perhaps is the fact that the UK made it more difficult for employees to 
access justice for unfair dismissal and indeed any other employment related claim by 
instituting fees for employment tribunals and appeals. In addition, the rules on continuity of 
service have increased from one year to two years, which means employees have to work for 
two continuous years before a dismissal can be subject to the scrutiny of a tribunal.110 There 
are also now fees applied to filing tribunal claims,111 which affects not only unfair dismissal 
claims, but those relating to discrimination and other socially important aspects of 
employment law. The UK has also promoted alternative dispute resolution mechanisms over 
tribunals.112 
 
Impact of Financial Crisis on Rescue Regimes 
 
It is clear that employment benefits, job security, and worker protections have reduced in 
every EU member state since the financial crisis of 2007 and the subsequent sovereign debt 
crisis. While it is clear that this creates more a precarious situation for employees throughout 
the EU, it is not only through employment regulation that such protections may arise. The 
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rescue culture has also created an environment aimed at preserving employment through the 
preservation of businesses or of enterprises. As such, the impact of the financial crises on EU 
rescue regimes throughout the member states is also a relevant consideration as 
improvements in this area of law could bridge the gulf left by the reduction in protection 
provided through employment regulation. As such, the following section will discuss and 
analyse relevant changes to rescue regimes in Greece, Portugal, France, and the UK with a 
view to determining whether the rescue culture itself provides an embankment for those 
rights that have been lost through the flexibilisation of the labour market occurring in 
response to the financial crises of the first two decades of this second millennium.  
 
There have been a number of reforms to insolvency and corporate rescue laws throughout the 
EU in the early 2000’s and then just following the financial crisis with aims of supporting a 
rescue culture, though the various regimes under examination here have found themselves at 
different depths along the stream of rehabilitation and recovery. These regimes have operated 
with varied success as an effective embankment for the protection of failing businesses and 
the social and economic welfare associated with them. For the purpose of this article, the 
focus of attention will be on pre-insolvency rescue procedures. 
 
Greece 
 
Prior to the reforms of 2007, Greece lacked any kind of sophisticated corporate rescue 
regime. Rather its insolvency system was geared towards liquidation, which has historically 
resembled the French insolvency system. Rehabilitation under the old system was only 
theoretically possible through a settlement of debts between the debtor company and its 
creditors by way of a voluntary reorganisation through a direct creditors’ agreement, though 
this method did not provide for a “cram-down” on dissenting creditors. 113 
 
The 2007 Insolvency Law114 aimed to update an outdated system by introducing radical 
changes to the Greek insolvency philosophy, providing for the rescue of ailing companies and 
offering a second chance to insolvent debtors. It provided for quick and easy access to 
rehabilitation procedures and was primarily designed to ensure the rescue of viable distressed 
companies and associated preservation of employment. It introduced the conciliation and 
judicial reorganisation procedures. Conciliation was a debtor in possession procedure similar 
to the French procedure of the same name that was designed to rehabilitate the business and 
to preserve employment. A debtor in financial difficulties would apply to the court to initiate 
a conciliation procedure, including a plan for extricating itself from its difficulties. If 
satisfied, the court would appoint a conciliator with the task of achieving an agreement 
between the debtor company and its creditors in order to overcome the company’s financial 
distress and safeguard its survival.115 The debtor would then be immune to individual 
enforcement for a period of two years while the reorganisation plan was being implemented. 
However, the conciliation procedure proved inadequate to the task due to its consensual basis 
and lack of cram-down. The requirement to appoint a conciliator or mediator also led to a 
lengthy process that made it impossible to bring the parties to agreement quickly. In addition, 
the conciliation procedure has been abused by debtors as a means of securing a preliminary 
order prohibiting creditors from enforcing their claims, thus leading to procedural abuse.116 
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In 2011, a new law was passed that replaced conciliation with rehabilitation.117 This revised 
procedure allows a debtor to obtain the ratification of a restructuring plan agreed with the 
requisite majority of creditors without any other judicial assistance or protection. The debtor 
can also submit an application for the opening of negotiations with creditors in which it can 
seek the appointment of a mediator to facilitate negotiations or it can seek to negotiate 
directly with a creditors’ committee, or on a bilateral basis where a qualified majority of 
creditors negotiate directly with the debtor company. This procedure is technically pre-
bankruptcy, but the debtor company must show that it is in a state of financial weakness. 
Crucially, following the reforms of 2015, access to the procedure has been improved and is 
no longer draconian. Access to the rehabilitation procedure is no longer restricted to 
companies that are actually insolvent and perhaps already too far downstream to be rescued, 
or on the verge of insolvency. Although it is not necessary to demonstrate that the debtor is in 
actual cessation of payments, the court must be persuaded that the debtor is likely to become 
insolvent. A moratorium can also be put into place through a preliminary order by the court 
after an application for rehabilitation proceedings has been received.118 
 
While the new rehabilitation is a clear improvement119 over the conciliation procedure, it also 
has serious obstacles to overcome in order for it to make any significant contribution to 
rescuing companies, saving jobs and maximising value for the financially distressed debtor 
company’s stakeholders overall.120 The process is also still overly dependent on the Greek 
judicial system.121 In addition, it has been argued that there might be a risk of misuse of the 
procedure by solvent companies seeking to force a compromise with their creditors, although 
fully capable of meeting their existing obligations.122   
 
Furthermore, while a pre-pack style of procedure is available in Greece, it requires a number 
of months and contested hearings under Greek procedural requirements. Greek business 
culture is also an issue given that the success of a rescue procedure depends on residual trust 
and good faith between the debtor and its stakeholders. Greek business culture tends to be 
suspicious of these processes, viewing them as a prelude to default and often precipitating 
damaging responses from suppliers and banks. The abuse of the previous system does not 
help in this negative view.123 However, more recently further steps124 have been taken for the 
modernisation of the Insolvency Code in order to create an attractive and efficient 
environment for all the parties involved.  
 
In addition, there have been further negotiations between the Greek government and the 
troika in an attempt to revive the Greek economy. The troika proposals provide for a quicker, 
inexpensive, and less bureaucratic registration of companies, as well as further amendments 
to the Greek Insolvency Code, so as to facilitate the out-of-court settlement of debts. It is 
proposed that the out of court “compromise” procedure will only be available to medium-
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sized and large businesses. However, it is submitted that the proposals will only play a trivial 
role in the revival of the economy, as the proposed new procedure shall not apply to the 
majority of troubled businesses, namely small businesses. The Greek rescue culture is 
therefore still a work in progress. It is yet to be seen whether the most recent changes will 
result in the rescue of more viable businesses, having the concomitant effect of preserving 
those jobs associated with them. Thus, it is unclear if Greek employees are likely to derive 
any additional benefit from this revised rescue regime, though the trend of decreasing 
unemployment data may be a positive sign of things to come.    
 
Portugal 
 
Similar to the Greek Insolvency Laws, the Portuguese Insolvency Act was originally geared 
towards the winding-up of companies and provided struggling companies with few means of 
recovery.125 However, rescue procedures in Portugal are available in the Insolvency Plan, an 
out of court proceedings similar in form to the German Insolvenzplan as set out in the 
Insolvency and Enterprise Rescue Code126 in 2004. The purpose of this procedure is either to 
liquidate an insolvent debtor’s assets and distribute the proceeds to creditors, or to satisfy 
creditor debt in a manner envisaged in an insolvency plan that is based on the recovery of the 
company. However, this plan was available only available if the company was indeed 
insolvent, thus not technically a pre-insolvency rescue procedure. In order to initiate the 
procedure, the debtor had to find it impossible to carry out financial obligations that have 
already fallen due.127 
 
The Portuguese MoU required that reforms be introduced that facilitate more effective rescue 
of viable firms, including fast-tracking court approval procedures for restructuring plans. 
Thus, Portuguese legislators introduced reforms in 2012 that added a new hybrid proceeding 
to the insolvency plan aimed only at pre-insolvency situations, the “special revitalisation 
proceeding”.  It is available to those companies facing economic difficulties or that are in an 
imminent insolvency situation. The procedure is comprised of a period of negotiations 
between the company and its creditors with the aim of agreeing to a restructuring plan. Once 
agreed by a qualifying majority of creditors and approved by the court, the plan becomes 
binding upon all creditors, whether dissenting or not.128 Since its implementation, the new 
revitalisation procedure has seemed popular among a number of different debtors, companies 
and individuals alike.129 
 
There are, however, certain weaknesses in this new procedure. While it is advantageous that 
the restructuring can now be carried out without the company being declared insolvent, in the 
event that negotiations do not arrive at an equitable solution, the company then risks being 
declared insolvent and subject to the opening of proceedings.130 Part of the problem here is, 
like Greece, a cultural suspicion of debt and insolvency is still present. If the debtor is unable 
to satisfy the creditors that any compromises made will be worth engaging in the process, 
those creditors might well initiate insolvency proceedings in order to protect themselves from 
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what they may view as an untenable or even unscrupulous process. That said, the 2012 
reforms did make changes to the classification of insolvency, which had before been 
associated with the finding of guilt for those causing the financial troubles. It is no longer 
compulsory unless there is evidence of intentional or grossly negligent conduct by the 
company directors.131 
 
The 2012 amendments did not, however, provide any reformative measures for the 
insolvency plan, despite the undisputed flaws in the regime. Thus it remains equally difficult 
for insolvent companies, even though still viable, to escape liquidation. The absence of 
amendments to the insolvency plan, in addition to the shortening of the term to file for 
insolvency, make a company’s position under Portuguese insolvency law that much more 
pressured, rather than alleviating the stress.132 Where difficulties for businesses are 
encountered, so too are risks for employees, thus it is also unlikely that the most recent 
changes made to Portuguese corporate rescue procedures will provide any additional security 
for employees at this stage. 
 
France 
 
France might be considered the inventor of the concept of corporate rescue, beginning in 
1967 even prior to the legendary Chapter 11 procedure of the United States introduced in 
1978 that many systems now try to emulate. In the 1990s the mandataire ad hoc and the 
amicable settlement provided preventative pre-insolvency procedures. The Law of 2005133 
revised the ad hoc mandate and replaced the amicable settlement with conciliation. The ad 
hoc mandate is a procedure whereby a third party is appointed by a presiding judge to 
consider possible solutions to the debtor’s problems and are usually governed by case law 
rules rather than by statute. The conciliation procedure is a type of mediation open to 
businesses in foreseeable or acknowledged difficulty, as well as those already in a state of 
cessation de paiements. The procedure gives creditors the opportunity to agree a legally 
binding agreement with the debtor company.134 
 
The Law of 2005 also introduced the procedure of sauvegarde (preservation) as an up-stream 
option to the conciliation and ad hoc procedures, aimed at early intervention in a failing 
company. However, and without leaving much time for the new procedure to become 
integrated into practical usage, its perceived underutilisation led to a reform in 2008. The 
Ordinance of 2008135 made major changes to all of the procedures contained within the 
French insolvency system. The bulk of its provisions addressed the perceived deficiencies of 
the sauvegarde procedure.136  
 
The global financial crisis also led to changes in practice which prompted further reforms in 
the Law of 2010,137 introducing a French style of pre-pack in a new procedure called the 
sauvegarde financière accélérée (accelerated financial preservation). Designed mainly for 
larger companies, it allowed a company undergoing conciliation to enter into the sauvegarde 
if they had a plan that they could convince the court would assure the continuation of the 
business and command the support of a majority of creditors. These procedures, out of the 
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range available among the four jurisdictions under study herein, appear to be the most 
advanced, up-stream, pre-insolvency procedures available, perhaps throughout the whole of 
the EU. However, the continued impact of the financial crisis, the impact of the Eurozone 
crisis, concerns about the continued viability of French businesses, and chronic 
underemployment has led to yet another set of reforms in 2014. This was preceded by a 
review and a report on the state of insolvency that stated that the principal objectives for any 
reform would be to facilitate the anticipation of worsening economic conditions by 
businesses, to reinforce the efficiency of procedures by adjusting the impact to creditors, 
debtors and others, to adapt to the prevailing reality of the treatment of businesses in an 
irremediable and compromised situation, while at the same time respecting the relative rights 
of creditors and debtors as well as to ensure greater security, simplicity and effectiveness.138 
The result was an Ordinance of 2014,139 which introduced two new procedures: sauvegarde 
financière and the rétablissement professionnel, both of which are dependent upon another 
procedure previously being engaged. The former is a variation on the sauvegarde theme as an 
agreement among the principal creditors and the debtor and contains a cram-down element, 
while the latter deals with impecunious estates. The sauvegarde financière has the advantage 
of speed and efficiency in terms of not losing business value and is intended not to affect 
employees at all.140 
 
While the frequency of reform in France is great and perhaps, due to that fact, confusing, it 
also shows a willingness to change with the time in such a way as to keep improving the 
effectiveness of corporate rescue processes. France’s inherent concern for its workers is also 
supported by the constant improvement of corporate rescue as this inevitably assists in 
maintaining a higher level of job security. Thus, despite some decrease in employment 
protection in France, its seemingly effective up-stream and highly responsive rescue regime 
may well provide some relief in terms of job security that may have been lost following the 
introduction of some flexibilising factors in the last few years by ensuring the preservation of 
viable businesses and those jobs associated with them.  
 
United Kingdom 
 
The most significant reforms to insolvency law in the United Kingdom in the most recent 
past occurred seven and five years before the beginning of the crisis with the Insolvency Act 
2000141 Enterprise Act 2002, both of which came into force on 2 November 2002.142  These 
Acts modified the Insolvency Act 1986 by replacing certain of its provisions with new 
sections and schedules aimed at improving rescue procedures in terms of efficiency, benefit, 
and practical use. The 2000 Act reformed the Company Voluntary Arrangements (“CVA”), a 
pre-insolvency procedure which now provides small companies with the option of a 
moratorium, while the 2002 Act reformed the administration procedure. The latter of these 
has had arguably the most significant effect on the UK rescue culture as it went further to 
protect unsecured creditors, streamlined the procedures, and was implemented despite the 
resistance of banks, financial institutions, and other primary lenders who had benefitted from 
the exclusive control that administrative receivership had allowed.143 The new procedure 
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presents three hierarchical objectives: to first try to rescue the company as a going concern, or 
to achieve a better result than would be achieved in liquidation. Finally, if the first two 
options were unattainable, an insolvency practitioner could seek to realise property in order to 
make distributions to secured or preferential creditors.144 It is not, however, a pre-insolvency 
procedure in its purely statutory form. 
 
However, one could argue that the pre-pack administration does function as a pre-insolvency 
type of mechanism, though it is a non-statutory practice process that functions on the premise 
of a pre-packaged sale by an administrator on terms that have been agreed before the 
administration is commenced, but which is carried out shortly after the appointment of an 
administrator.145 This process avoids the disruption to business common to normal insolvency 
procedures and also reduces the potential reputational damage due to its secretive nature. 
While the secretive nature of pre-packs has come under scrutiny in recent years, particularly 
with regard to their effects on employment protection, they are very commonly used and 
constitute an important element of the UK’s insolvency procedures.146 With particular regard 
to the protection of workers’ rights, while UK case law confirms that the TUPE regulations 
would apply to transfers occurring out of pre-pack administrations,147 this has not been a 
particularly serious issue in practice,  due to the way that pre-packs are used: mainly as a tool 
for debt restructuring.148 The pre-pack procedure has proven to be a useful debt restructuring 
mechanism, which has attracted many ailing businesses within the UK, as well as businesses 
operating outside the UK. However, in the sphere of international insolvency law, the strict 
application of the TUPE regulations on pre-packs, combined with reforms of the insolvency 
and rescue rules of other jurisdictions, may render the UK pre-pack tool less competitive for 
foreign companies that might have sought to re-organise their financial affairs elsewhere. 
However, in light of the recent decision of the UK to exit the EU, one must wait for further 
developments, as the UK may in the near future find itself able to disregard completely the 
application of the TUPE Regulations. 
 
In addition, the CVA is a pre-insolvency mechanism that is sometimes used as a freestanding 
and sometimes in conjunction with an administration or a pre-pack procedure. The CVA is a 
compromise between the debtor company and its creditors that facilitates the rehabilitation of 
the struggling company without having resort to a formal insolvency procedure, which could 
otherwise consume the assets of the company. As a debtor-friendly procedure, it also 
encourages companies to seek help at an earlier stage of their difficulties.149 It could also be 
argued that the amendments that were introduced to the CVA by the Insolvency Act 2000 
addressed key inadequacies150 of the procedure and also clearly demonstrated the shift 
towards a corporate rescue culture in the UK.  Notwithstanding the reforms to the CVA 
procedure, its use has been limited. This could be due to the fact that the long-awaited 
reforms took place a little too late, or simply due to the fact that the new streamlined 
administration provides greater protection to the debtor company by means of a moratorium, 
which is available to all companies regardless of their size, hence overshadowing the CVA. 
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Finally, the flaws of the original CVA procedure discouraged insolvency practitioners, who, 
as a result never really embraced it and relied on alternative procedures, such as the pre-pack 
and schemes of arrangement.151  
  
In addition to the CVA, the Scheme of Arrangement,152 although not technically within the 
remit of insolvency law provides another mechanism through which companies can deal with 
their financial problems at an earlier stage. A scheme of arrangement allows a company to 
reach a compromise with its creditors, or any class of its creditors, or with its members, or 
any class of them. A scheme may also be used by a group of companies and it can prove 
particularly useful where the group is seeking to hive off any of its underperforming 
elements. As opposed to the CVA,153 a scheme involves a complex voting structure. 
However, once a reorganisation plan is approved it becomes binding on all creditors. In 
addition, it is important to note that, under a scheme of arrangement, it is not necessary to 
consult any class of creditors who have no real economic interest in the company, hence their 
votes on the scheme may be disregarded. 
 
Thus there are a number of options for up-stream pre-insolvency procedures in the UK, 
providing a means of preserving business and, by association, employment. However, the 
employment protection regime in the UK does not provide a high level of protection that can 
be depended upon in or outside of insolvency situations. Thus, while the rescue regime in the 
UK is clearly advanced and generally effective, the lack of comparative employment 
protection is unlikely to be sufficiently counterbalanced by the employment preservation 
provided by the rescue regime as job security is simply not a focus of social policy to the 
same level that one finds in France, for example. That said, of the four jurisdictions examined 
herein, the UK has remained the jurisdiction with the lowest unemployment rates since the 
financial crisis of 2007.   
 
Conclusion 
 
The employment protection and corporate rescue reforms often differ in their fundamental 
functions, but are both important aspects of a healthy economy. Excessive inequalities in 
terms of wages and productivity have been at the root of depressions and economic 
recessions during the modern era. Such imbalances heighten the risk of economic failure. A 
growing wage and productivity gap upsets the natural mechanisms necessary to achieve 
economic balance. Where wages fall, so too does consumption, leading to deflation where 
demand is not supported.154 This also applies to the economic benefit of unemployment 
insurance as this helps to stabilise consumer demand in the face of economic downturns, 
which would otherwise be sapped by rising unemployment.155  
 
While employment protection and other socially oriented regulation provide an important 
safety net for employees who are in an inherently less powerful bargaining position than 
employers generally, the financial crisis has seen these measures reduce in strength 
throughout the EU, except exceptionally perhaps for France. As these measures reduce in 
strength, employee rights in insolvency also fall behind as redundancy, dismissal, collective 
agreements and transfer of undertakings are often implicated in insolvency and rescue 
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processes. If one looks at corporate rescue not only as a means of preserving economically 
viable businesses, but also as a part of the social aims of employment protection, there arises 
an additional reason to ensure that corporate rescue processes are effective: the protection of 
the employees. The rescue culture might provide another level of employment protection, an 
embankment against the ravages of economic recession and crisis, in which an effective 
rescue system might help to alleviate some of the severity of the effects that the financial and 
sovereign debt crisis have had on the rights and security of employees and workers.   
 
In terms of how these four regimes have fared in the rescue culture mission to preserve 
business and associated employment, it would appear that all have taken steps forward in 
progress. However, Portugal and Greece have some distance to travel before they attain the 
level of the French system and, indeed, so does the UK. Indeed, the changes made to the 
rescue regimes of Portugal and Greece do not yet appear come close to effectively rescuing 
enough viable businesses to make any real difference with respect to employment 
preservation. While France has both a protective employment regime and an effective rescue 
culture, employment data continues to demonstrate that despite these protections in place, 
France has trailed behind the UK in unemployment rates since the financial crisis, and 
continues to do so at the time of writing in 2017.  
 
What, then, does this mean in terms of the effectiveness of a rescue culture in comparison to 
the level of employment protection and whether the two can supplement each other to 
enhance employment preservation? It could be that for the two peripheral member states 
examined herein that their introduction to the Euro occurred at a time when their economies 
were not sufficiently prepared or advanced enough to compete on the levelled playing field of 
competition that this created in the EU. There is certainly evidence of this in Portugal’s 
financial struggles in 2001. In addition, the Greek labour economy was and is of such a 
different form compared to other Western European countries that it is not surprising that 
obstacles were encountered following political and financial integration. But even more 
telling and perhaps also perplexing is the fact that while France possesses a highly protective 
employment law system and an advanced upstream corporate rescue regime, Britain 
continues to maintain a more robust economy and lower levels of unemployment, despite 
lower employment protection. This may point to the value of determining an optimum 
balance point between business and labour as while labour protection does what it says on the 
tin, viable businesses are also needed in order to employ labour, making a focus on the rescue 
culture certainly a rational step in the direction of achieving that optimum balance that may 
result, in part, in stronger EU member state economies overall.    
 
 
 
